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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1990, Congress enacted the Family Unity and Employment
Opportunity Act (the "1990 Act"), which created a visa lottery to
enhance the diversity of the immigrant stream and to ensure that
areas of the world sending relatively few immigrants to the United
States could still have access to the immigrant stream.1 In order to
achieve these goals, Congress created a complex formula by which
55,000 "diversity" visas would be distributed annually among six
geographically defined regions based on the total number of
1. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c) (2005) (setting forth the diversity visa lottery). With the release of
the 2004 immigration statistics, we can now review the effects of 10 years of the permanent
diversity visa lottery.
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immigrant admissions from each region. 2 Under this formula, regions
with relatively low admission rates are granted more visas than
regions with relatively high admission rates. 3
As the bulk of immigrants to the United States come from Asia
and North America (primarily Mexico), it is not surprising that fewer
diversity visas are granted to North American and Asian immigrants
than to immigrants from Europe and Africa. 4 What is startling is how
few diversity visas are allotted to immigrants from South America,
even though every year there are fewer non-diversity 5 immigrants
from South America than from Europe. 6 For example, in 2004, South
America accounted for approximately 8% of all non-diversity
immigrant admissions, significantly less than the 12% that came from
Europe. 7  In that same year, almost 38% of all diversity visa
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c)(1).
3. See id. The population of each region also plays a role in the calculus. For purposes of
this Note, that part of the diversity formula can be largely ignored, but it does explain why the
Oceania region qualifies for so few diversity visas.
4. See infra app. tbls. 3 & 5.
5. This Note refers to all visas issued under any provision other than the diversity visa
lottery as "non-diversity" visas, and any immigrants admitted under any non-diversity visas as
non-diversity immigrants.
6. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 2004
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS tbl. 8, available at http://uscis.gov/graphics
/sharedlstatistics/yearbook/2004/table8.xls [hereinafter 2004 YEARBOOK]; OFFICE OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 2003 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS 29-32 tbl.8, available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook
/2003/2003Yearbook.pdf [hereinafter 2003 YEARBOOK]; OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 2002 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 30-33 tbl.8,
available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbookl2002/Yearbook2002.pdf
[hereinafter 2002 YEARBOOK]; IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, 2001 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 42-45 tbl.8, available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/
statistics/yearbookl2001/yearbook2001.pdf [hereinafter 2001 YEARBOOK]; IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2000 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 44-47 tbl.8,
available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbookl2000/Yearbook2000.pdf
[hereinafter 2000 YEARBOOK]; IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 44-47 tbl.8, available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/
statistics/yearbook/1999/FY99Yearbook.pdf [hereinafter 1999 YEARBOOK]; IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1998 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 44-47 tbl.8,
available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook/1998/1998yb.pdf [hereinafter
1998 YEARBOOK]; IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1997
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 44-45 tbl.8, available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/
statistics/yearbook/1997YB.pdf [hereinafter 1997 YEARBOOK]; IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES IN
FISCAL YEAR 1996 tbl.6, available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/archives
/fy96/1007.htm [hereinafter IMMIGRATION IN FISCAL YEAR 1996]; IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES IN
FISCAL YEAR 1995 tbl.6, available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/archives
/fy95/133.htm [hereinafter IMMIGRATION IN FISCAL YEAR 1995].
7. See 2004 YEARBOOK, supra note 6, tbl.8.
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immigrants came from Europe, but only 3% of all diversity
immigrants came from continental South America.8
This Note will shed light on the legislative slight of hand
responsible for this discrepancy, which has been largely overlooked in
th6 debate surrounding the diversity visa lottery: the strategic
definition of the South America region.9 By defining the South
America region to include, for diversity lottery purposes, Mexico,
Central America, the Caribbean, and the South American continent,
the drafters of the diversity lottery were able to limit a cultural
group's access to the lottery while simultaneously ensuring that a
maximum number of lottery visas would be available for European
and African immigrants.
To put the enactment of the diversity visa lottery in context,
Part II will offer a brief overview of the history of U.S. immigration
law and policy through the 1990 Act, and Part III will discuss the
8. See id. This Note compares admissions in the same year to illustrate the lottery's actual
effect on the immigrant stream. When the number of visas to be sent to each region is actually
calculated, however, all admissions from the past 5 years (including diversity-based admissions)
are tabulated. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c) (2005).
9. Most of the debate about the lottery has centered on the propriety of promoting
diversity by admitting more Europeans, or by discriminating between countries and regions
generally. See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, No Place for Angels: In Reaction to Kevin Johnson, 2000 U.
ILL. L. REV. 559, 587-89 (2000) (discussing approaches used to reduce immigration from Asia and
Latin America and concluding that the diversity visa lottery "is evidence ... that current
immigration law is tainted by race discrimination"); Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration
Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A "Magic Mirror" into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J.
1111, 1135 (1998) (noting that Congress, "in an ironic twist of political jargon" established the
diversity visa lottery which, "though facially neutral, prefers immigrants from nations populated
primarily by white people"); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Equality and Diversity, 31
COLUM. J. TRANSNT'L L. 319, 330, 333-34 (1993) (discussing the rationales for the "so-called
'diversity' program" and the questions it raises about "the role that ethnicity should play in our
immigration laws"); Stanley Mailman, Upcoming Visa Lottery, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28, 1994, at 3
(discussing the possible policies behind the diversity visa lottery and stating that the underlying
implication - "that natives of one country are ... less desirable than those of another" - is an
"unfortunate addition" to our immigration system); Kunal M. Parker, Official Imaginations:
Globalization, Difference, and State-Sponsored Immigration Discourses, 76 OR. L. REV. 691, 713-
14 (1997) (noting that "the very existence of a category of immigration based purely on difference
is at odds with an emphasis on productivity, skills, resources, and self-sufficiency as organizing
principles of legal immigration"); Symposium, Challenges in Immigration Law and Policy: An
Agenda for the Twenty-First Century, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 521, 537-39 (1994) (arguing
that the diversity visa lottery's attempt to help countries "adversely affected" by the repeal of the
national origins quota system is comparable to an attempt to benefit whites that were "adversely
affected" by the 1964 Civil Rights Act); Jan C. Ting, "Other than a Chinaman": How U.S.
Immigration Law Resulted From and Still Reflects a Policy of Excluding and Restricting Asian
Immigration, 4 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 301, 308-10 (1995) (arguing that the diversity visa
lottery works to exclude Asian immigrants); Walter P. Jacob, Note, Diversity Visas: Muddled
Thinking and Pork Barrel Politics, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 297, 311-13, 329-30, 337-43 (1992)
(describing lobbying efforts by an Irish political interest group in favor of the diversity visa
lottery, and noting the problems inherent in the use of any "diversity" criteria to effectuate
immigration policy).
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legislative history of the diversity visa lottery. Part IV will provide a
detailed exploration of the effects of the distinctive region definitions
in the "so-called" diversity visa lottery10 and the ostensible reasons for
these definitions. Finally, Part V will discuss a number of potential
solutions to this disparate treatment (including legislation introduced
this year that would eradicate the lottery, albeit for very different
reasons), advocating ultimately in favor of a random lottery that does
not discriminate with respect to nationality or ethnicity.
II. SETTING THE STAGE
Few issues "cut as deeply into the emotions of Americans as
immigration. That is why comprehensive, fundamental reform of
immigration policy occurs infrequently."11  This Section will set the
stage for one of those rare attempts to fundamentally reform U.S.
immigration policy: the Family Unity and Employment Opportunity
Act of 1990, which enacted the diversity visa lottery. To put the 1990
Act in context, this section will present a brief history of U.S.
immigration law, followed by an overview of the principles and policies
that guide immigration reform and an explanation of how those
principles and policies affected the 1990 Act.
A. A Brief History
Congress enacted virtually no immigration restrictions until
1875, thus permitting a large influx of Chinese and European
immigrants seeking opportunities associated with the California gold
rush and the construction of the transcontinental railroad. 12 But in
1875, Congress began a pattern of restricting immigration along racial
lines by making it a felony to contract to supply Chinese laborers.1 3
Subsequent acts prohibited the immigration of "all persons of the
Chinese race" except for elite classes such as government officials, and
required all Chinese nationals to obtain certificates of identity. 14
10. Legomsky, supra note 9, at 320.
11. Lawrence H. Fuchs, Immigration Policy and the Rule of Law, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 433,
433 (1983).
12. James F. Smith, A Nation that Welcomes Immigrants? An Historical Examination of
United States Immigration Policy, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POLY 227, 228-29 (1995).
13. Id. at 230; see also Ting, supra note 9, at 302-03 ('The popular view of Chinese as
criminals and prostitutes led to the enactment of the first federal statute restricting immigration
in 1875, an act which excluded criminals and prostitutes from immigrating to the United
States.").
14. Ting, supra note 9, at 303-04; see also Smith, supra note 12, at 230 (noting that the
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 "banned the immigration of Chinese laborers for ten years ... and
1966 [Vol. 58:6:1963
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Chinese immigrants found without certificates of identity would be
deported unless their legal residence could be established by a
"credible white witness."15  By 1917, Congress had restricted
immigration from other Asian countries and excluded other
"undesirables" from the immigration stream, such as convicts,
prostitutes, disabled persons, anarchists, polygamists, alcoholics,
illiterates over age 16, and paupers. 16
In the 1920s, Congress modified its immigration policy by
enacting and refining a national origins quota system designed to
"preserve the Northern European and British Isles composition of the
population" by forcing the ethnic composition of the immigration
stream to mirror the ethnic proportions of foreign persons already
present in the United States. 17 By 1952, Congress had eliminated all
exclusions based on race (perhaps out of deference to its World War II
and Korean War allies) 8 ; but the national origins quota system
remained in effect until the civil rights turmoil of the 1960s. 19
Congress repealed the national origins quota system in 1965,
replacing it with a new focus on family reunification and uniform per-
country ceilings, codified in the Immigration Act of 1965 (the "1965
Act"). 20 The unpredicted effect of the 1965 Act, however, was the
prohibited Chinese from becoming United States citizens"). The Supreme Court upheld these
acts, declaring that Congress's power to exclude and deport aliens was absolute. See Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606-10 (1889) (upholding the Chinese Exclusion Act of
1882); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711-14, 728-32 (1893) (upholding the 1892
Act, which imposed the certificate of identity requirement); see also Ting, supra note 9, at 303-05
(discussing the Supreme Court's holdings, in Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting, that Congress
has "absolute power" to exclude and order deportations").
15. Ting, supra note 9, at 303-04.
16. See Smith, supra note 12, at 230-31.
17. Id. at 232-33 & n.29; see also RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW §§ 1:1, 4
(1985) (describing the quota system). The Americas remained exempt from the established
quotas, Smith, supra note 12, at 232, but Congress further restricted Asian immigration during
this period by limiting immigration from the "Asiatic barred zone" (essentially China, Japan, and
Korea), Legomsky, supra note 9, at 327. See also Fuchs, supra note 11, at 433-34 (discussing the
quota system).
18. See Smith, supra note 12, at 233 (stating that Congress repealed the Chinese exclusion
during World War II "because it felt that such legislation represented a continuing insult to its
Chinese ally").
19. Ting, supra note 9, at 305-06; Smith, supra note 12, at 233. In 1952 Congress also
passed laws favoring highly skilled workers as immigrants and curbing illegal immigration from
Mexico. Smith, supra note 12, at 233.
20. Legomsky, supra note 9, at 328; see also Smith, supra note 12, at 233-34 (discussing the
repeal of the national origins quota system and the imposition of per-country limits); Kiera
LoBreglio, Note, The Border Security and Immigration Improvement Act: A Modern Solution to a
Historic Problem?, 78 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 933, 938 (2004) (discussing the 1965 Act's focus on
family reunification). While Asian immigration increased dramatically following passage of the
Act, immigration from the Americas was limited for the first time (albeit only by a hemisphere
quota until 1976, when the country quotas were applied to the Americas), resulting in a severe
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creation of a "geographically uneven immigrant stream" and long
delays in the visa issuance process. 21 Another unforeseen effect of the
1965 Act was to increase illegal immigration from Mexico, a country
which previously had not been subjected to the quotas. 22 In 1986,
Congress responded to concerns about illegal immigration with the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (the "IRCA"). The IRCA
imposed sanctions on employers for hiring undocumented workers,
allocated more money for border control, and granted amnesty to
illegal immigrants who had been present continuously in the United
States since 1982.23
Following the enactment of the IRCA, Congress also began a
series of temporary programs designed to increase the number of visas
available for countries determined to be "underrepresented" or
"adversely affected" by the repeal of the national origins quota system
backlog and long delays to would-be Mexican and Caribbean immigrants. See id. at 938 ("As a
result [of the 1965 Act] an unforeseen volume of Mexican and Caribbean immigrants... caused
huge delays in the visa application process; this backlog delayed family reunification, which may
have actually spurred illegal immigration." (internal citation and quotation marks omitted));
Smith, supra note 12, at 234-35 & n.44 (discussing the problems the limit on Western
Hemisphere immigration posed for Mexican immigrants, and the imposition of country ceilings
on Western Hemisphere countries in 1976). Moreover, the family reunification policy may have
exacerbated these delays by increasing the number of prospective immigrants with qualifying
family ties to the United States. Legomsky, supra note 9, at 328-29. Although these effects may
seem obvious in hindsight, there is some evidence that Congress did not think the effect would be
so dramatic. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. S7793 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Moynihan).
21. Legomsky, supra note 9, at 328-29; see also infra note 44. Attempts to remedy these
delays have made little progress. As of September 2005, the current waiting period for a
prospective immigrant in the Philippines in the first and third preference categories (unmarried
and married adult sons and daughters of citizens) is approximately fifteen years. U.S. Dep't of
State, Visa Bulletin (Sept. 2005), available at http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvilbulletin/bulletin_
1360.html. A Philippine immigrant in the fourth preference (brothers and sisters of adult
citizens) can expect a twenty-two year wait. Id. The wait for similar Mexican immigrants is
currently thirteen to twenty-two years. Id.
22. Smith, supra note 12, at 235; see also Frederick G. Whelan, Principals of U.S.
Immigration Policy, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 447, 456-57 (1983) (noting that "the whole phenomenon
of illegal immigration from south of the United States border is partly an artifact of recent
changes in American law" and that the policy of policing the border "has given those coming now
an incentive to bring their families and stay, rather than travel back and forth as in the past").
The long visa delays caused by the Act may also have been partially responsible for the increase
in illegal immigration. LoBreglio, supra note 20, at 938.
23. LoBreglio, supra note 20, at 939; see also Smith, supra note 12, at 236-40 (discussing
the provisions of the IRCA). The amnesty program aimed to curb illegal immigration by
providing a clean slate on which to implement the new immigration policies, which focus on "the
rule of law." See infra Part I.B (discussing the rule of law principle, one of three principles that
make up current United States immigration policy). The IRCA also created new categories of
temporary workers and non-immigrant workers, such as seasonal agricultural workers. Smith,
supra note 12, at 236-40.
1968
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in 1965.24 With the 1990 Act, Congress further addressed concerns
about perceived imbalances in U.S. immigration policy by allocating
more visas for some family-based categories, increasing employment-
based immigration, and creating the diversity visa lottery. 25 The
employment provisions were aimed at "highly-educated or highly-
skilled" immigrants, as well as "wealthy foreigners" who would invest
at least one million dollars into the creation of a "new commercial
enterprise."26 The diversity visa lottery, which built on the temporary
programs designed to benefit "adversely affected" countries, allocated
visas to aliens from countries with low U.S. admission rates in an
attempt to "restructure the ethnic mix of the immigrant pool."27
B. Policies and Principles
The current landscape of U.S. immigration policy is as
convoluted as its history. Although family reunification is still the
preferred model, at least according to many legislators, it no longer
dominates the policy landscape as it did under the 1965 Act. Rather,
policymakers now confront multiple "issues on which moral and
political philosophy comes face to face with the practical exigencies of
legislation."28
At least three principles currently guide the formulation of
U.S. immigration policy: international cooperation, the rule of law,
and the notion of an "open society."29 The principle of international
24. Legomsky, supra note 9, at 328-29 (noting that the 1965 Act's imposition of country
limits and the Act's emphasis on family unity resulted in a "geographically uneven immigrant
stream," and that in 1986 Congress began enacting "a series of one-shot-only temporary
programs" designed to benefit countries "adversely affected" by the 1965 Act's repeal of the
national origins quota system). Not surprisingly, the "adversely affected" countries were almost
all from Europe: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bermuda, Canada,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the
German Democratic Republic, Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Guadeloupe, Hungary,
Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Monaco, the Netherlands, New Caledonia, Norway, Poland, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland,
and Tunisia. Jacob, supra note 9, at 299 n.14.
25. Smith, supra note 12, at 241.
26. Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5) (2005).
27. Smith, supra note 12, at 241.
28. Whelan, supra note 22, at 447. As a threshold matter, countries are generally
acknowledged to have "an unrestricted, or discretionary, authority over immigration." Id. at 447.
Thus, it may be "morally permissible for immigration policy to be based exclusively on
considerations of interest." Id. at 451. In this sense, immigration policy "may more closely
resemble foreign policy." Id. at 450.
29. See Whelan, supra note 22, at 453 (describing the three principles that underlie the
proposals of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy); Fuchs, supra note 11, at
438 (discussing how the Select Commission was guided by these three principles when it made
its recommendations to the President and Congress).
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cooperation allows U.S. immigration policy "to take another nation's
interests into account as well as our own," whether to create "a more
equal distribution of income and opportunities among the world's
people regardless of national boundaries," or to lessen "migratory
pressures" by alleviating the conditions that cause them.30 The rule of
law principle asserts that our immigration policy "should be enforced,
and therefore [should be] enforceable," which means that
policymakers should only act on those policies that the public will be
willing to pay to enforce. 31  Finally, the "open society" principle
maintains that accepting people from other countries is in the national
interest because immigrants "may be expected to contribute in the
future, to economic growth and to cultural diversity and
enrichment." 32
Consideration of these principles has resulted in the
establishment of the policies that have influenced immigration reform
legislation.33 For example, some of the more prominent policies
affecting immigration legislation include diversity, family
30. Whelan, supra note 22, at 481-83. To illustrate, IRCA's amnesty provision can be
viewed as an attempt to (eventually) reduce migratory pressure on the United States from
Mexico by temporarily relieving Mexico of some of its unemployed citizens "until its population
control and economic development policies yield better results." Id. at 482.
31. Id. at 455-56. Whelan points out that this principle raises concerns about the
compatibility of non-discrimination with the preservation of a distinctive national character, an
admitted national interest. Id. at 457-58. Moreover, the "formal equality of treatment for
countries obviously does not mean equality of opportunity for individuals .... Equal treatment
for individuals would have called for omitting considerations of nationality altogether and
accepting applicants on a first-come first-served (or a lottery) basis within a world-wide
pool .... " Id. at 458-59. Professor Fuchs, who was the Executive Director of the Select
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, asserts that "the rule of law emerged as the
most powerful and, strangely enough, the most controversial" principle during Select
Commission proceedings. Fuchs, supra note 11, at 438; see also id. at 445 (stating that "economic
considerations took second place to those based on jurisprudence").
32. Whelan, supra note 22, at 460-61. For example, some degree of openness may be a
moral requirement, such as the acceptance of refugees. Id. at 461. Insofar as there will be
restrictions, the principle of openness also questions how selective we should be in determining
who will be admitted; are willing immigrants inherently beneficial to society, or should they be
screened for certain desirable characteristics? See id. (discussing the principles underlying a
system of selective immigration as opposed to a truly open or random system).
33. See Fuchs, supra note 11, at 443 (stating that "policy is not just a matter of how many
are admitted, from what countries and by what criteria, but also the process by which they are
admitted"). The issue of how many immigrants should be admitted is well beyond the scope of
this Note. Some relevant considerations, however, include: What level of population growth is
desirable for the United States, and for the world? What will be the impact on the respective
population growth rates of admitting more individuals into a comparatively low-fertility society?
How does it impact the environment and the national and world economies to admit more
individuals into a high-production high-waste society? How will current immigration levels affect
future willingness to admit immigrants? For a helpful discussion of these points, see Whelan,
supra note 22, at 463-69. The issue of procedure is also beyond the scope of this Note.
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reunification, and national economic well-being. 34  The policy of
diversity is designed to enhance "cultural diversity, consistent with
the national interest."35 This objective is pursued by enhancing access
to the immigration stream from a greater variety of source countries. 36
The general idea of family reunification has not generated significant
controversy, but its implementation has. 37  The conflict centers
primarily on whether the family-based preferences should reach
beyond the nuclear family.38 The general economic policy underlying
immigration is to promote economic growth, or at least to "not cause a
decline in the average economic welfare (income) of the population."39
While immigration has generally enhanced economic growth and may
help offset the "aging" of the U.S. population (and the looming Social
Security crisis), critics argue that high levels of immigration keep
wages at low rates.40
A look at history reveals how these policies and principles have
already influenced immigration law. For example, economic fears
largely drove the decisions in the late nineteenth-century that led to
the exclusion of Chinese and other Asian immigrants. 41 And it was
the principle of international cooperation, forged by war-time
alliances, that ultimately defeated these restrictions. Likewise,
principles of the "open society" and diversity led to the repeal of the
national origins quota system (which was premised on anti-diversity)
and the enactment of the 1965 Act.4 2 Ironically, however, the very
provisions that repealed the national origins quota system, when
coupled with the principle of family reunification, may have actually
created a less diverse immigrant stream (hence causing the concerns
34. Whelan, supra note 22, at 469. The policy decisions underlying decisions to accept, or
not to accept, refugees are also beyond the scope of this Note. For an insightful discussion on the
relevant considerations, see Fuchs, supra note 11, at 435-37, 445-46. See also Smith, supra note
12, at 236 (discussing U.S. refugee policy).
35. Whelan, supra note 22, at 469.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 471-72. The general policy has been questioned, however, as an instance of
"nepotism." Id. at 472-73. While this seems like an otherwise unjust discrimination of
"independent" immigrants, the alternative is to admit laborers without their families, a morally,
socially, and economically dubious proposition. See id. at 473.
38. Id. at 471-72.
39. Id. at 474.
40. Id. at 474-76. It has also been pointed out that admitting motivated immigrants may
deprive developing nations of needed labor. Id. at 476.
41. See Ting, supra note 9, at 302 (describing the economic conditions that led to the
"clamor in the western United States against immigrants from China" that caused Congress to
enact restrictive immigration laws).
42. Whelan, supra note 22, at 458.
20051 1971
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that led to the enactment of the diversity visa lottery).43 Finally, the
IRCA may have been an attempt to establish the rule of law just for
the sake of letting law rule, irrespective of the policies behind or the
effects of any particular law. 44 This jumbled mess of policies and
incoherently applied principles was the impetus for Congress's
attempt to reformulate almost every aspect of immigration policy with
the 1990 Act.
C. The Immigration Act of 1990
In 1990, after two years of deliberations, Congress enacted the
most dramatic changes in immigration law since 1965. 45 In addition
to addressing concerns about diversity in the immigration stream, the
1990 Act endeavored to deal with economic concerns such as labor
shortages and the desire to recruit highly skilled workers and wealthy
investors from foreign countries. 46 It also tried to strengthen the
family reunification provisions by addressing certain controversial
areas, such as the family preference categories. 47 Additionally, the
1990 Act revisited the entire system of temporary (or non-immigrant)
visas.48 According to the House Report, the purpose of the 1990 Act
was to
[e]ase current U.S. immigration law restrictions that (1) hinder the reunification of
nuclear families, (2) impose barriers to immigration on nationals of countries that have
served as traditional sources of immigration to the United States, and (3) severely limit
43. See id. at 470 ("If cultural and especially linguistic diversity is the goal that justifies the
policy of imposing equal country ceilings, then the policy may be adjudged a partial failure in its
recent operation .... With respect to the salient and politically sensitive matter of language, at
any rate, recent immigration has been less diverse than was immigration before diversity
became a conscious objective."). See also supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
44. Whelan, supra note 22, at 454-55; see also Fuchs, supra note 11, at 439 (noting that the
Select Commission decided it was necessary to "close the back door to illegal migration" in order
to "maintain the open society - to keep the front door open"). For example, the heavily criticized
amnesty provision was advocated as the means of cleaning the slate before ushering in a new era
dominated by the rule of law. Whelan, supra note 22, at 454. The idea was that supporting a
group of "second-class" persons was too costly to our system of government. Fuchs, supra note 11,
at 440 (quoting SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, 97TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 72 (1981)). But concerns that amnesty would
create a perverse incentive to immigrate illegally in hopes of another amnesty provision have
largely been vindicated.
45. Mark W. Peters, Note, Much Ado About Anything? The Effect of the Immigration Act of
1990 and Subsequent Amendments on Nonimmigrant Alien Artists and Entertainers, 38 WAYNE
L. REV. 1661, 1661 (1992).
46. H.R. REP. NO. 101-723, pt. 1, at 41-42, 58-72 (1990).
47. Id. at 40-41, 73.
48. Id. at 43-45.
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the number of highly skilled or otherwise needed foreign-born workers who may become
lawful permanent residents of the United States.
4 9
III. ENACTMENT OF THE DIVERSITY VISA LOTTERY
Conceding that the 1990 Act was a broad attempt to reshape
the entire landscape of U.S. immigration policy, this Note addresses
only one of the ways in which the 1990 Act implemented just one of
these policies: diversity, through the diversity visa lottery.50
Furthermore, this Note deals with just one aspect of the lottery - the
region definitions. It should be noted, however, that the diversity visa
lottery constituted just one part of a substantial and complex
immigration reform, which undoubtedly explains the absence of
significant opposition to the specific mechanisms behind the diversity
lottery. 51 Although this does not legitimize Congress's action, it is
inevitable that there will be some give and take between legislators
and interest groups when so many interests are at stake.52 That being
said, the diversity provisions did face some controversy on the
legislative floors.
49. Id. at 31.
50. Other diversity-based provisions included the temporary lottery (which was specifically
designed to give most of the visas to Ireland and Northern Europe), and provisions granting
visas to specific countries. See Pub. L. No. 101-649, §§ 132-34, 152, 104 Stat. 4978, 5000, 5005
(1990) (providing 40,000 visas in the years 1992, 1993, and 1994 to immigrants from countries
that are "not contiguous to the United States and that [were] identified as ... adversely affected
foreign state[s]"; also providing 1000 visas to "displaced Tibetans"; also providing visas for
employees of the United States consulate in Hong Kong).
51. See Jacob, supra note 9, at 331-35 (discussing the need to form broad coalitions across
immigrant groups to secure passage of significant legislation).
52. See 136 CONG. REC. S17106 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ('This
legislation represents a compromise. Each of us would have written this bill differently if we
could. The issues surrounding legal immigration stir deep emotions and strong political
passions."); Jacob, supra note 9, at 331-35; see also Immigration Act of 1989 (Part 3): Joint
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and Int7 Law of the Comm. on the
Judiciary and the Immigration Task Force of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong. 687
(1990) (statement of Daniel A. Stein, Executive Director of the Federation for American
Immigration Reform) ("The topic of immigration reform is one that cannot be taken lightly or
addressed in just a series of short hearings, followed by a speedy mark-up. Immigration reform
comes with open debate over many months .... Exchanges are made and compromises are
reached that are equitable to both sides."); 136 CONG. REC. S17113 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Simpson) (calling immigration "the greatest political no-win turkey I have
ever been in").
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A. Background
By 1988, Congress was concerned that so few immigrants were
coming from "traditional sources" of immigration.5 3 This concern was
not without some justification. The 1989 President's Comprehensive
Triennial Report on Immigration (the "Triennial Report") showed that
only about 10% of immigrants came from Europe in 1985, 1986, and
1987.54 Furthermore, the Triennial Report indicated that Asia and
North America (including Mexico, Central America, and the
Caribbean) accounted for almost 80% of all immigrants in each of
those years.55
On the demographics of current immigration, the Triennial
Report concluded:
The highest number of immigrant admissions (42.8 percent) were from Asia in 1987 ....
Following the trend that began with the elimination of the national origins quotas ...
[in] 1965, the highest percentage of immigrants came from Asia during the 1985-1987
period. This pattern has been true every year since 1978 ....
Mexico, the Philippines, and Korea were the three leading countries of birth for
immigrants admitted to the United States during the 1985-1987 period .... With the
exception of 1982 when Vietnam led all countries. . ., Mexico was the leading country of
immigration to the United States during the 1980s.
5 6
Concerns about these demographic disparities prompted both the
Senate and the House to consider ways to increase immigration from
European countries in their respective versions of what would become
the 1990 Act.
B. In the Senate
The Senate first approved a version of the 1990 Act in 1988 by
a substantial majority, but the House sat on the bill until the 100th
53. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-723, pt. 1, at 31; 136 CONG. REC. S2211 (daily ed. Mar. 15,
1988) (statement of Sen. Thurmond) (noting that new legislation was needed to "put Western
Europeans on a more equal footing with the rest of the immigrant pool"); 136 CONG. REC. S17110
(daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Dodd) ("In recent years certain traditional sources of
American immigration have been disadvantaged....").
54. THE PRESIDENT'S COMPREHENSIVE TRIENNIAL REPORT ON IMMIGRATION, INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES tbl.F (1989) [hereinafter TRIENNIAL REPORT]; see also infra
app. tbl.1. The Triennial report was mandated by the IRCA legislation.
55. TRIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 54, tbl.F; see also infra app. tbl.1. According to the
Triennial Report, South America accounted for about 7% of immigrants annually, Africa for
about 3%, and Oceania for less than 1% annually. Id.
56. TRIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 54, at 12, The other countries in the Triennial Report's




Congress expired.57 Senators Simpson and Kennedy reintroduced the
legislation in February 1989, promoting it as a response to the 1981
Report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. 58
Senator Kennedy argued that the bill (S. 358) was intended "to make
our immigration system more accurately reflect the national interest,
more flexible, and also more open to immigrants from nations which
are short-changed by current law." 59  The bill placed a greater
emphasis on reunification of close family members (i.e., the nuclear
family) and employment-based immigration, and created a new
category of independent immigrants. 60
There was no visa lottery in S. 358. Instead, the bill contained
a points-based system directed at the perceived inequities against
would-be immigrants from countries that were "adversely affected" by
the demise of the national origins quota system. In the words of
Senator Simpson, this new system of "independent" immigration
addressed the concern that
[miany of the older source countries of immigration-that is, Europe and Canada-no
longer are able to qualify under today's family-dominated system, and some areas of the
world have not in the past and do not now have the family ties necessary to send large
numbers of immigrants to the United States-such as Africa.
6 1
Of course, some legislators criticized the system for purporting
to increase diversity by bringing in more Europeans and Canadians.
Furthermore, there is considerable evidence that this provision of the
legislation was largely tailored to meet the demands of Irish
immigrant special interest groups. 62  Nonetheless, there was
substantial agreement in the Senate that northwestern Europeans,
57. 136 CONG. REC. S1228-29 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
58. Id. at S1229.
59. Id.
60. This is a necessarily short description of all that this bill was designed to accomplish.
There are many more aspects to the bill that are beyond the scope of this Note (such as the way
it re-structured the family preference system, the way it designed the employment-based system,
and the immigrant investor provision). One provision worth mentioning, however, is the NP-5
program, which allocated visas to immigrants from countries "adversely affected" by the 1965
legislation. See H.R. REP. No. 101-723, pt. 1, at 76-77. The definition of an "adversely affected"
country is one so defined by the IRCA legislation, "except countries contiguous to the United
States." Id. at 77; see also supra note 24.
61. 136 CONG. REC. S1230 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Simpson).
Interestingly, Canada has never qualified for visas under the diversity visa program because it
sends too many immigrants (more than 50,000 in any five-year period). See, e.g., Bureau of
Consular Affairs, Registration for the Diversity Immigrant (DV-2006) Visa Program, 69 Fed. Reg.
65012, 65016-17 (Nov. 9, 2004) (listing countries whose natives qualify for the lottery).
62. For a very insightful discussion on this point, see Jacob, supra note 9, at 311-35
(describing in depth the efforts and effectiveness of the behind-the-scenes legwork of special
interest groups, particularly pro-Irish groups, in passing the diversity provisions).
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such as "Irish, Germans, Italians, [and] Poles" were being
"inadvertently discriminated against by the present system."63
The points-based approach of S. 358 was designed to admit
immigrants based on the number of points they scored under an
elaborately designed point allocation system.64 Points were awarded
for a variety of factors, including age (up to 10 points), education (up
to 25 points), occupational demand (up to 20 points), occupational
training and work experience (up to 20 points), and prearranged
employment in the United States (up to 15 points).65 A provision
awarding a relatively high number of points to potential immigrants
who spoke English, however, proved too controversial, 66 and the
Senate ultimately removed it from the bill. The Senate approved S.
358 on July 13, 1989, by a vote of 81-17.67
C. In the House
Following months of committee hearings and mark-ups, the
House Committee on the Judiciary recommended passage of the
corresponding House bill (H.R. 4300) in September 1990. This bill
largely followed the model of the S. 358, and it served the same three
purposes: to "strengthen[] our system of family reunification"; to
"providef to the employers and employees of this country a system of
legal immigration for... individuals who are needed in our economy";
and to "ensure[] the long-term diversity in our flow of immigrants
from around the world."68  H.R. 4300, however, eliminated the
Senate's independent immigration system, replacing it with a
63. 136 CONG. REC. S1843 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1989) (statement of Sen. D'Amato); see also
136 CONG. REC. S8529 (daily ed. July 20, 1989) (statement of Sen. Daschle); 136 CONG. REC.
S7896 (daily ed. July 13, 1989) (statement of Sen. Simpson); 136 CONG. REC. S7793 (daily ed.
July 12, 1989) (statement of Sen. Moynihan); 136 CONG. REC. H2164 (daily ed. May 24, 1989)
(statement of Rep. Fish).
64. S. 358, 101st Cong. (1989).
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. 87865 (daily ed. July 13, 1989) (statement of Sen. Simpson);
136 CONG. REC. S7865 (daily ed. July 13, 1989) (statement of Sen. Simon); 136 CONG. REC. 87751
(daily ed. July 12, 1989) (statement of Sen. Simon); 136 CONG. REC. S7633-34 (July 11, 1989)
(statement of Sen. Simpson); 136 CONG. REC. S2211 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Pell).
67. 136 CONG. REC. 87907 (daily ed. July 13, 1989).
68. 136 CONG. REC. H8631 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. Morrison); see also
Immigration Act of 1989 (Part 3): Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees,
and Int'l Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary and the Immigration Task Force of the Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong. 687 (1990) (app. 1, text of H.R. 4300).
1976 [Vol. 58:6:1963
DIVERSITY VISA LOTTERY
permanent diversity visa lottery similar to the ad hoc programs that
had surfaced recurrently since 1986.69
1. Committee Hearings
From September 1989 through March 1990, the House
Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and
International Law conducted a series of hearings to consider S. 358
and four alternative immigration reform bills. All four bills had some
diversity provision: H.R. 672 and H.R. 2448 had points-based systems
similar to the Senate bill, but differed in how the points should be
allocated; H.R. 2646 deferred the issue to the executive branch,
allowing the President to determine which immigrants to admit
consistent with foreign policy goals and the national interest; and H.R.
4165 introduced the diversity visa lottery provisions almost exactly as
they now stand.
Interestingly, H.R. 4165, the only bill to include a visa lottery,
was not introduced until March 1, 1990. But no representative of any
ethnic-based organization testified in or submitted a statement to the
hearings after September 27, 1989.70 Hence, these organizations were
not given an opportunity to directly respond to the diversity visa
lottery in the subcommittee hearings. These organizations did
comment at the subcommittee hearings on the other bills, however.
And, although the majority of their testimony addressed the proposed
changes to the family preference system, the diversity provisions
clearly concerned them, as each organization commented on the
diversity provisions of the bills before them.
For example, the National Council of La Raza (the "NCLR")
indicated at the subcommittee hearings that it did not oppose creating
69. The House bill also introduced the transitional diversity visa lottery that lasted until
1994. Because the transitional lottery followed substantially different rules than the permanent
lottery, I will not discuss it at length in this Note. However, it should be noted that the
transitional lottery, and the entire bill, appeared to some representatives as a patchwork of
special interest legislation heavily influenced by various immigration advocacy groups, including
the same Irish immigration groups that affected the Senate bill. See 136 CONG. REC. H12359
(daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep. Bryant); 136 CONG. REC. H8677-78 (daily ed. Oct. 2,
1990) (statement of Rep. Smith); Jacob, supra note 9, at 325; see also 101 CONG. REC. H12367
(daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep. Richardson) (listing 17 varied special interest groups
that "strongly" supported the legislation).
70. The September 27, 1989, hearing included testimonies from representatives of the
American Committee on Italian Migration, the National Council of La Raza, the American
Jewish Committee, the Chinese Welfare Council, the Irish Immigration Reform Movement, and
the Organization of Chinese Americans; there was also a joint statement by various Asian and
Pacific American organizations. See Immigration Act of 1989 (Part 1): Hearings Before the




a new avenue for immigration, but "that it should be done with careful
consideration, on a trial basis only" because it represented "an
unprecedented step in immigration policy." 71 The NCLR opposed S.
358 because it did not include the family members of independent
immigrants selected under its points-based system, which could
further aggravate backlogs for family preference visas. 72 The NCLR
also opposed H.R. 2448 because it awarded points for English
language ability: "[A]ny new channel for immigrants must promote
equity and diversity in the best traditions of the U.S. The point
categories should not even give the appearance of favoring some parts
of the world over others." 73 The NCLR supported the points-based
system of H.R. 672 because it did not contain an English language
provision, it provided for family members of selected immigrants, and
it would begin on a trial basis. 74
Similarly, the Organization of Chinese Americans, Inc. (the
"OCA"), supported H.R. 672 and opposed H.R. 2448 because of the
English language provision. 75  The OCA directly addressed the
potential for discrimination in the selection of independent
immigrants at the subcommittee hearings: "The point system program
should not directly or indirectly favor any regions of the world. If after
enactment, the program is determined to not enhance diversity, then a
random lottery first-come, first-serve system should be immediately
implemented." 76
The Chinese Welfare Council (the "Council") also advocated a
first-come, first-serve system at the subcommittee hearings. 77 The
Council criticized the points-based approach of S. 358 for failing to
provide for accompanying family members and for assigning points for
employment criteria when separate employment-based immigration
categories already existed. The Council asserted: "If the purpose of
the selected immigrant category is to permit persons to immigrate
71. Immigration Act of 1989 (Part 1): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Refugees, and Int'l Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 216 (1989) (statement of
Cecilia Mufioz, Senior Immigration Policy Analyst for the National Council of La Raza). The
NCLR is a "national organization dedicated to improving life opportunities for Hispanics in the
United States." Id. at 205.
72. Id. at 216.
73. Id.
74. Id. The American Jewish Committee also favored the points-based system of H.R. 672,
partly because it would begin on a trial basis. See id. at 277 (statement of Gary E. Rubin,
Director of National Affairs of the American Jewish Committee).
75. Id. at 251 (statement of Melinda C. Yee, Executive Director of the Organization of
Chinese Americans). The OCA is "a national, non-profit, non-partisan network of concerned
Chinese Americans." Id. at 241.
76. Id. at 251 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 287-88 (statement of Howard Hom, Chinese Welfare Council).
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who would not otherwise be able to come under the current law, then
the system would operate better on a first-come first-serve basis
without any computation of points .... ,,78
The Reverand Joseph A. Cogo, representing the American
Committee on Italian Migration (the "ACIM"), on the other hand,
opposed S. 358 at the subcommittee hearings because it did too little
to diversify the immigration stream:
S. 358 unfortunately does dismally little, if anything at all, to resolve the problem of
the present imbalance in the usage of visas and to create diversity in our immigration
flow.
I suspect that the [points-based system] was conceived with the intent of favoring
the traditional flow of European immigration.... Honorable as this intention may be, I
am afraid this [points-based system] will not solve the Irish problem at all. There are
far more Asiatics [sic] - young, skilled, educated and ambitious-than there are Irish in
Ireland. And, in point of fact, even if you count together the Irish, the Italians, the
Portuguese and the Greeks, they will still be unable to compete, numberwise, with the
number of potential immigrant candidates from Asia.7 9
The ACIM concluded that a "regional ceiling or a regional floor are the
only practical ways to ensure diversity in our immigration flow. 80
The Irish Immigration Reform Movement (the "IIRM") also
indicated that a points-based system would do too little to help the
Irish. Instead, the IIRM proposed that the legislature allocate 30,000
visas annually for 15 years to applicants from specific "disadvantaged"
countries in addition to a points-based diversity system designed to
assist "underrepresented" countries.81 The IIRM stated: "[T]here is no
question that the [proposed systems] are not fair and balanced by
themselves. They are not meant to be. However,... they create some
balance against a system which is currently heavily weighted against
many countries in the world."8 2
Not only did the hearings fail to include testimony from ethnic-
based organizations about H.R. 4165 and the diversity visa lottery,
but the hearings failed to include almost any testimony addressing the
diversity visa lottery provision of H.R. 4165 at all. Other non-ethnic
78. Id. at 287. A joint statement submitted by various Asian and Pacific American
organizations also opposed passage of S. 358's independent immigration provisions, albeit largely
because of the provision awarding points for English language proficiency that had already been
removed. See id. at 613-14 (joint statement of Asian American Legal Defense and Education
Fund (New York); Asian Law Alliance (San Jose); Asian Law Caucus (San Francisco/Oakland);
Asian Pacific American Legal Center of Southern California; Na Loio No Na Kanaka-Lawyers
for the People of Hawaii; and Nihonmachi Legal Outreach (San Francisco)).
79. Id. at 259-60 (statement of Rev. Joseph A. Cogo, American Committee on Italian
Migration).
80. Id. at 262.
81. Id. at 222-25 (statement of Donald Martin, Irish Immigration Reform Movement).
82. Id. at 224 (emphasis in original).
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based groups did testify after the introduction of H.R. 4165 about the
merits of increasing the diversity of the immigration stream in
general; but most did not testify about the specifics of the diversity
provisions.8 3
The little testimony that did address specific provisions took
aim at the various points-based systems8 4 For example, the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace testified at the subcommittee
hearings that it favored increasing the stream of independent
immigrants but argued against tailoring provisions specifically to
increase diversity.8 5 Similarly, Richard D. Lamm, Director of the
83. See, e.g., Immigration Act of 1989 (Part 3): Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Refugees, and Int'l Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary and the Immigration Task
Force of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong. 564 (1990) (statement of Malcolm Lovell,
Jr., Former Under Secretary of Labor and Director of the Institute for Labor and Management at
George Washington University) ("Diversity is desirable but it should be a by-product rather than
a deliberate goal of our immigration policy. Our overriding objective must be to select the most
skilled, versatile and adaptable immigrants... whatever their country of origin."); id. at 669-71
(statement of Eugene McNary, Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service)
(stating that the administration considered it a fundamental principal that "[w]e should continue
to adhere to the current practice of admitting all aliens without regard to race, creed, sex or
national origin," but that the administration considered "[p]reserving and promoting diversity in
sources of immigration" an important policy goal); id. at 279-97 (statement of Leon F. Bouvier,
Visiting Professor of Sociology, Old Dominion University) (discussing at length the impact of the
demographics of the immigrant stream on American society, concluding that fewer immigrants
should be admitted and that concern for the individual, as opposed to concern for specific groups,
should be the prevailing principle).
There was some testimony relating to the impacts of high levels of Hispanic and Asian
immigration at the local level, but the testimony focused on the need to help local governments
meet the demands of a growing immigrant population, as opposed to the merits of diversity (or of
particular diversity provisions) in the immigration process. See id. at 514-16, 541-47 (1990)
(statement of Patrick Burns, Center for Public Policy and Contemporary Issues at the University
of Denver) (discussing the impacts of high levels of Asian and Hispanic immigration on
California schools); see also id. at 597-605 (statement of Ellen Rodriguez, Program Administrator
for the National Association of Counties) (arguing that changes in immigration policy at the
national level can have serious economic consequences at the local level); id. at 609-17
(statement of Mark A. Tajima, Legislative Analyst for the Chief Administrative Office of the
County of Los Angeles, CA) (same).
84. See, e.g., id. at 253-54 (statement of Prof. Barry R. Chiswick, Department of Economics,
University of Illinois at Chicago) ("It is essential to preserve the non-racist character of the plan.
Points should not be awarded on the basis of the applicant's race, religion, ethnicity, or country
of origin."); id. at 269-72 (statement of Ben J. Wattenberg, Senior Fellow, American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research) (advocating a points-based system as well as additional
visas made specifically available to immigrants from Europe).
85, Id. at 133-34 (statement of Doris Meissner, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace). Ms. Meissner stated:
Increasing independent immigration ... is a sufficient response to the problem of
diversity of source countries.
Demand for immigration to the U.S. is simply not evenly distributed by geography,
nor has it ever been so in our history. Demand is a function of family flows ... ; from
special economic or cultural relationships among countries ... ; and by the legacy of
historical connections .... Of course, these forces change and potential immigrants
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Center for Public Policy and Contemporary Issues at the University of
Denver, proposed that immigrants should be selected "on the basis of
merit ... without regard to race, religion or ethnicity."8 6 And the
American Bar Association submitted to the subcommittee a February
1989 ABA resolution stating, among other things, that "the American
Bar Association supports ... a separate additional quota allotment for
independent or unsponsored immigrants based on a
nondiscriminatory selection system or lottery, or both... ,"87 The only
hearing testimony that addressed H.R. 4165's diversity visa lottery
provision expressed indifference as to how the immigrant stream was
diversified.88
2. Evolution of H.R. 4300
Five days after the conclusion of the subcommittee hearings,
Representative Morrison, chairman of the subcommittee, introduced
H.R. 4300.89 Subcommittee and committee markups began two days
later, on March 21, 1990. On September 19, 1990, the Judiciary
Committee submitted a favorable report of H.R. 4300 to the House. 90
Interestingly, H.R. 4300 contained no diversity provision of any kind
when it was introduced to the subcommittee after the March
hearings; 91 but the version of the bill introduced to the House after
should not be artificially shut out when they do. However, changes in the levels of
independent immigration should be adequate to meet this standard. It is not
necessary, in addition, to construct ways to build in an outcome of increased source
country diversity.
Id.
86. Id. at 512 (statement of Richard D. Lamm, Former Governor of the State of Colorado
and Director of the Center for Public Policy and Contemporary Issues at the University of
Denver). Mr. Lamm criticized the various bills for "set[ting] no priorities and mak[ing] no hard
choices" by "saying yes to virtually every interest group with a demand to make on the
immigration process." Id. at 499-500.
87. Id. at 908 app. 21 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 432-33 (statement by Thomas R. Donahue, Secretary-Treasurer, American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations). Mr. Donahue stated:
We agree that the United States should be accessible to nationals of all countries.
The question is how this good is to be obtained ....
The Senate chose an elaborate point system .... [H.R. 672] adopts a point system
but on a time-limited pilot basis. [H.R. 2448] proposes a point system ... somewhat
differently defined. And [H.R. 4165] also would allow for "diversity" immigrants, using
a still-different basis for ascertaining the targeted countries. Given this diversity of
riches, for once I will be so modest as to say that we agree with the end sought and
have no favorite as to the proper means.
Id.
89. See id. at 687 app. 1; 136 CONG. REC. H903 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1990).
90. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-723, pt. 1, at 1; 136 CONG. REC. H7889 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1990).
91. See Immigration Act of 1989 (Part 3): Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Refugees, and Int'l Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary and the Immigration Task
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subcommittee and committee markups contained a diversity visa
lottery provision almost identical to the one in H.R. 4165.92
The report of the Judiciary Committee contained no
explanation as to why the lottery was selected over the other
proposals, even though the lottery was in direct conflict with the
Senate bill's diversity system. Citing inequities to immigrants from
certain countries, "such as Italy, Ireland, Poland, and Argentina,"
caused by the repeal of the national origins quota system in 1965, the
report simply stated:
The Committee is convinced that... changes must be made to further enhance and
promote diversity within the present system....
In order to maintain diversity in immigration to our nation, a regional program is
created by the bill. This ongoing program, which begins in 19[9]4, provides 55,000
annual visas for natives of regions of the world where immigration through the
preference system has been lower than 50,000 over the previous five years.
9 3
The only other comments in the report that directly addressed the
diversity lottery simply described the lottery's mechanics and asserted
that it was designed to be self-adjusting in order to maintain diversity
in immigration notwithstanding varying immigrant flows. 94
The dissenting views published in the Committee's Report, by
contrast, specifically attacked the diversity visa lottery:
H.R. 4300 expands immigration privileges to specific regions and countries under the
guise of creating a more diverse immigration flow .... Instead of creating an underlying
immigration system which is neutral as to race, religion, or national origin, H.R. 4300
grants additional visas to specific countries and regions which, the bill alleges, have
been treated unfairly. This is not a rational way to create immigration policy.
Force of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong. 687-773 app. 1 (1990) (providing the text of
H.R. 4300).
92. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 101-723, pt. 1, at 5-6 (containing the diversity visa lottery
section of H.R. 4300), with Immigration Act of 1989 (Part 3): Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Immigration, Refugees, and Intl Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary and the Immigration
Task Force of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong. 52-57 (1990) (containing the diversity
visa lottery section of H.R. 4165).
93. 101 H.R. REP. No. 101-723, pt. I, at 48. The report actually states that the program was
to begin in 1944, but as the Report was published in 1990, this must be a misprint. The Act
actually set forth that the permanent diversity visa lottery would begin in 1994. In determining
whether any country has sent over 50,000 immigrants in the previous five years, only family-
sponsored immigrants, employment-based immigrants and their immediate family, and the
immediate relatives of citizens are counted. Id. at 78, 86. Currently the lottery only issues 50,000
visas annually as a result of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of
1996, which reserved the use of 5,000 of the 55,000 annual allotment of diversity visas to allow
certain undocumented aliens from Central America to adjust their status. See Michael M.
Hethmon, Diversity, Mass Immigration, and National Security After 9/11-An Immigration
Reform Perspective, 66 ALB. L. REV. 387, 391 (2003).
94. H.R. REP. No. 101-723, pt. I, at 78.
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... We also object to H.R. 4300's designation of certain countries, regions or
continents.
9 5
The dissenters asserted that "the appropriate approach is to readjust
the underlying system to make it equitable, not to give additional
visas to specific countries. '96
On the House floor, the discussion of H.R. 4300's diversity visa
lottery provisions echoed the same themes advanced on the Senate
floor in support of S. 358's points-based system. Specifically,
supporters cited the need to increase diversity in the immigration
stream by allocating visas to underrepresented countries (primarily
European). 97 There was some opposition to the diversity provisions in
the House, 98  but for the most part they were supported.
Conspicuously absent, however, was any discussion of the merits of
the House bill's diversity visa lottery as a means of increasing
"diversity" over the merits of the Senate bill's points-based system
designed to advance the same goal.99 The House adopted H.R. 4300 on
October 3, 1990.
95. H.R. REP. No. 101-723, pt I, at 138-40 (dissenting views).
96. Id. at 140.
97. See, e.g., id. at 48; 136 CONG. REC. E3110 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Scheuer); 136 CONG. REC. E3098 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1990) (statement of Rep. Anderson); 136
CONG. REC. H8718 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1990) (statement of Rep. Schumer); 136 CONG. REC. H8718
(daily ed. Oct. 3, 1990) (statement of Rep. Weiss); 136 CONG. REC. H8667 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990)
(statement of Rep. Ortiz); 136 CONG. REC. H8650-51 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Markey); 136 CONG. REC. H8649 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. Engel); 136 CONG.
REC. H8644 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. Oakar); 136 CONG. REC. H8638 (daily ed.
Oct. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. Morrison); 136 CONG. REC. H8634 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990)
(statement of Rep. Fish); 136 CONG. REC. H8632 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep.
McGrath); see also 136 CONG. REC. E3148-49 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1990) (statement of Rep. Gilman)
(commending the Ancient Order of Hibernians, an Irish group, on their efforts to bring about the
1990 immigration reforms); 136 CONG. REC. E3118-19 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Donnelly) (arguing that the diversity visa lottery and other provisions did not do enough to
benefit potential Irish immigrants).
98. See 136 CONG. REC. H8641 (daily ed. Oct 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. Bryan) (explaining
that he will offer an amendment that strikes the diversity portions of the bill and leaves only the
family unity provisions); 136 CONG. REC. H8677-78 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (statement by Rep.
Smith) (arguing that H.R. 4300 actually works against fairness and equality by undoing the
work of the 1965 immigration bill).
99. Rep. Donnelly's comments published in the extension of remarks did discuss the merits
of specific aspects of the diversity visa lottery. However, he did not contrast this lottery with the
Senate's points-based system. His concerns were that the lottery did not start soon enough and
that it discriminated against countries with low populations, particularly Ireland, by only
allowing one application per person. See 136 CONG. REC. E3118-19 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1990)
(statement of Rep. Donnelly).
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D. From Bill to Law
The Joint Conference Committee adopted the House version of
the bill on October 26, 1990. The committee modified the diversity
visa lottery only by requiring that immigrants admitted under the
lottery have the equivalent of a high school degree. On consideration
of the Joint Conference report, the Senate did not directly comment on
the replacement of S. 358's points-based system with the diversity
lottery, and any comments made about the diversity provisions at all
were generalized. 0 0 This may have been because the drafters of the
Senate bill acquiesced to the changes in order to pass other reforms
that had been years in the making. 101 As stated by Senator Kennedy:
"This bill, like all major legislation, represents many years of work,
and many efforts at compromise .... This legislation represents a
compromise."'' 0 2  In the end, this compromise won out as both
legislative bodies approved the Joint Conference report, on October 27,
1990.103 President George Bush, Sr., signed the 1990 Act, and the
diversity visa lottery, into law on November 29.104
IV. THE REGION DEFINITIONS-WHY IS MEXICO IN SOUTH AMERICA?
The diversity visa lottery was designed to preserve the
diversity of the immigrant stream by "divid[ing] the world into high
and low admission regions," and allocating visas to each region "in the
inverse proportion [of] the percentage of immigrants sent to the
United States."'1 5 Therefore, the critical factor in determining how to
allocate diversity visas is the definition of each region; these
definitions dictate the type of diversity sought (e.g., cultural, racial,
100. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. S17109 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Simpson);
136 CONG. REC. S17110 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
101. Jacob, supra note 9, at 332 ("[F]rom the very beginning, our goal was to promote
diversity. We were willing to jettison the point system to keep diversity alive.") (quoting Michael
Myers, who served as counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on
Immigration and Refugee Affairs, on why the Senate sponsors were willing to adopt the House
provisions).
102. 136 CONG. REC. S17106 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
103. 136 CONG. REC. H12368-69 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990); 136 CONG. REC. S17568-69 (daily
ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
104. Statement of President George Bush Sr. upon Signing S. 358, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6801-
2. Notably, President Bush made no reference to the diversity provisions of the 1990 Act in his
signing statement. See id. at 6801-1 to 1-2. The President, however, did praise other provisions of
the act: "[This bill] accomplishes what the Administration sought from the outset of the
immigration reform process: a complementary blending of our tradition of family reunification
with increased immigration for skilled individuals to meet our economic needs." Id. at 6801-1.
105. H.R. REP. No. 101-723, pt. I, at 78. Then the visas are "apportioned according to the
population of [each] region." Id.
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geographic, etc.) by laying the framework on which the mathematical
formulations apply. Ultimately, the region definitions are responsible
for how the blind mathematical equations allocate diversity visas to
different countries.
In large part, the regions appear to be drafted along neutral
geographic lines: "[T]he areas described in each of the following
clauses shall be considered to be a separate region: (i) Africa. (ii) Asia.
(iii) Europe. (iv) North America (other than Mexico). (v) Oceania. (vi)
South America, Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean."'10 6 With
two notable exceptions, these regions roughly approximate the
continental divisions. They also roughly resemble, with the same two
notable exceptions, the regions used for groupings in official
immigration statistical reports, including the President's
Comprehensive Triennial Report on Immigration that was sent to
Congress in 1989: Europe, Asia, Africa, Oceania, North America
(including Central America and the Caribbean), and South America
(the continent). 10 7
The two notable exceptions are the subject of this Note: "North
America (other than Mexico)" and "South America, Mexico, Central
America, and the Caribbean."'08 As a cultural grouping, this division
may make sense. In fact, there is support for the proposition that
Congress actually intended to make this cultural grouping. For
example, in the hearings and Senate and House floor debates, the
terms "Hispanic," "Latin American," and "Central American" were
used almost interchangeably, particularly when talking about the
disproportionate number of immigrants coming from Mexico and
Central America. 10 9
Without discussing the cultural similarities and differences of
the various Latin American countries, "South America, Mexico,
Central America, and the Caribbean" is arguably a plausible cultural
grouping. The more significant question, however, is: Why did
Congress choose to make this cultural grouping when it avoided other
106. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c)(1)(F) (2005).
107. See, e.g., TRIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 54, tbl.F; 2004 YEARBOOK, supra note 6, tbl.8;
IMMIGRATION IN FISCAL YEAR 1995, supra note 6, tbl.6. The 2004 Yearbook explicitly includes
Central America and the Caribbean in North America, as does the Immigration to the United
States in Fiscal Year 1995 report. The numbers suggest that the Triennial Report did also.
108. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c)(1)(F) (2005) (emphasis added).
109. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. S7335 (daily ed. July 12, 1989) (statement of Sen. Cranston)
(noting that sibling relationships are important "in those countries-mostly Hispanic and Asian-
where [the sibling-based] visas are most used"); 136 Cong. Rec. E3110 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1990)
(statement of Rep. Scheuer) ("Over the past quarter century the vast majority of immigrants
have hailed from Latin America or from Asia.").
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possible similar groupings?110 The congressional record, itself, is
devoid of any explanation.1 '
One explanation may be that Congress sought to avoid a
politically charged (and counter-productive) attempt to promote
diversity by discriminating between cultures. It is not hard to
imagine the political repercussions to a Senator who introduced a
provision designed to select immigrants based on their religion or
primary language, for the ostensible purpose of increasing
"diversity."1 2 Focusing on objective geographic divisions is a much
more politically neutral way to promote diversity. 1 3
If Congress was only interested in geographic diversity,
however, why the cultural grouping of Latin America? Concerns
about excessive Hispanic immigration cannot be the only reason since
immigration from South America had been anything but excessive. 114
It is possible that the diversity lottery was a direct response to the
concerns of the ACIM that the Senate's points-based system did too
little to further the cause of European, and particularly Irish,
migration.115 An intent to increase European immigration can be
deduced from the statutory provisions defining the diversity lottery
regions, which provide a distinctly beneficial treatment for Irish
immigrants: "Only for purposes of administering the [diversity visa
110. For example, Egypt, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia are classified in two separate continental
regions instead of in a cultural grouping. But such a grouping is just as plausible as the
legislative commingling of Brazil, Jamaica, and Guatemala.
111. See supra Part III. Likewise, even ten years after the lottery took effect, commentators
have failed to explain the anomalous definition. Even Stephen Legomsky, who correctly details
the mechanics of the program and notes the lottery's disproportionately favorable treatment of
Europe and Africa, has not provided an explanation for the abnormal regional definition that
actually explains why so many visas are granted to Europe and Africa. See STEPHEN H.
LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 236-37 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing the
mechanics of the diversity visa lottery).
112. Indeed, a simple allocation of additional points for English language ability proved
controversial enough to require its removal from the Senate's original points-based system. See
supra note 66 and accompanying text.
113. For some interesting discussions on the meanings of diversity, equality, xenophobia,
globalization, and the implications of Congress's failure to define "diversity" in the 1990 Act, see
Hethmon, supra note 93, at 392-405 (discussing transnational diversity theory and its impact on
national immigration systems); Legomsky, supra note 9, at 321-25, 330-34 (considering various
universal ideas that arise from discussions of immigration policy and geographic priorities in
immigration policy); Parker, supra note 9, at 691-99, 727-30 (analyzing the impact of
globalization on immigration questions).
114. According to the Triennial Report, only 7% of all immigrants were coming from South
America. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
115. See Immigration Act of 1989 (Part 1): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Refugees, and Int'l Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 259-60 (1989) (statement of
Rev. Joseph A. Cogo, American Committee on Italian Migration); see also id. at 222-25
(statement of Donald Martin, Irish Immigration Reform Movement) (declaring that a point
system would not help the problems of Irish immigration to the United States).
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lottery], Northern Ireland shall be treated as a separate foreign
state .... 116 Granting Ireland double status for lottery purposes by
taking Northern Ireland out of the United Kingdom (which is limited
in its allotment of diversity visas because it already sends so many
immigrants to the United States) lends substantial support to
allegations that the creation of the lottery was little more than special
interest group appeasement. 117
The disparate Latin American cultural grouping may have
thus been an additional attempt to benefit prospective European
immigrants by limiting South American access to the diversity lottery.
If the South America region only included continental South America,
the number of diversity visas allocated to immigrants from continental
South America would be comparable to the number allocated to
immigrants from Europe and Africa because the number of total
immigrants coming from each of these continents is approximately the
same. 118 But the number of diversity visas allocated to potential
South American immigrants can be significantly curtailed if Mexico,
Central America, and the Caribbean are combined with continental
South America, since so many immigrants already come from Mexico,
Central America, and the Caribbean. The visas deprived would-be
South American immigrants by this unconventional geographic
grouping can then be made available to the other "low admission
regions"-most notably Europe and Africa. 119
This tactic is particularly effective because of its effect on the
North America region. After removing Mexico, Central America, and
the Caribbean, only Canada and Greenland remain in the North
America region. 20 Furthermore, Canada routinely sends more than
50,000 immigrants to the United States in any given five year period,
116. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c)(1)(F) (2005).
117. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-723, pt. 1, at 138-39 (dissenting views) ("Instead of
fashioning a policy for the national interest of all Americans, H.R. 4300 responds to every special
interest group that has made a demand on the United States immigration system."); Jacob,
supra note 9, at 311-21, 323-25.
118. See infra notes 124-128 and accompanying text.
119. A "low admission region" is a region that does not account for more than one-sixth of the
total number of immigrants over a five-year period. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c)(1)(B)(i) (2005).
120. For immigration statistics purposes, Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean are
typically included with North America. See supra note 107. For diversity lottery purposes, the
Bahamas has been included in the North America region, even though it is considered a part of
the Caribbean for immigration statistics purposes. Compare, e.g., Bureau of Consular Affairs,
Registration for the Diversity Immigrant (DV.2006) Visa Program, 69 FR 65012, 65017 (Nov. 9,
2004) (including the Bahamas in North America for the diversity visa lottery), with 2004
YEARBOOK, supra note 6 (including the Bahamas in the Caribbean).
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so it would not be allocated any diversity visas. 121 Thus, by grouping
Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean with continental South
America, the North America region could be turned into another
Oceania for purposes of the diversity visa calculus, never substantially
affecting the number of diversity visas available for European and
African immigrants. 122 In sum, through the strategic definition of the
South America region, the drafters of the lottery could simultaneously
preclude a particular cultural grouping from meaningful access to the
diversity visa lottery and ensure maximum access for European and
African immigrants.
The numbers bear this argument out. Every year since the
inception of the diversity visa lottery, there have been slightly fewer
non-diversity visa immigrants from continental South America than
from Europe, and slightly more non-diversity immigrants from
continental South America than from Africa. 23 Immigrants from
continental South America typically account for about 7% of all non-
diversity visas; European and African immigrants account for about
14% and 4%, respectively, of all non-diversity visas. 24 But while
immigrants from Africa and Europe together routinely account for
almost 80% of all diversity immigrants (about 44% and 35%,
respectively), less than 3% of all diversity immigrants come from
South America, even less than its already low percentage of non-
diversity admissions.1 25 In fact, of the four continents that each
account for less than one-sixth of total immigration, South America is
the only one that receives a smaller percentage of diversity visas than
non-diversity visas. 26 As predicted, North American immigrants
(including Central America and the Caribbean) usually account for
121. See Victor C. Romero, On Elidn and Aliens: A Political Solution to the Plenary Power
Problem, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 343, 369 (2001).
122. Because of its low population, Oceania is granted only a few diversity visas, despite its
low number of annual admissions. See infra app. tbls. 2-5; see also supra note 3.
123. For the discussion that follows, Tables 2-5 in the Appendix may be helpful.
124. See sources cited supra note 6.
125. See sources cited supra note 6.
126. The other three 'low admission" continents combined send four times as many diversity
immigrants as non-diversity immigrants. European immigrants typically receive about 14% of
all non-diversity visas and 44% of all diversity visas; African immigrants receive about 4% of all
non-diversity visas and almost 35% of all diversity visas; and immigrants from Oceania receive
about 0.5% of all non-diversity visas and about 1.4% of all diversity visas. Combined they
account for about 18% of all non-diversity immigrants and 80% of all diversity immigrants. See
infra app. fig. 1.
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roughly the same number of diversity visas as immigrants from
Oceania-about 1% to 2%.127
Of course, the numbers change with the regional definitions. 128
Under the legislative definition, the South America region accounts
for about 45% of all non-diversity visa admissions and less than 5% of
all diversity-based admissions; and the new North America (absent
Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean) accounts for only 2% of
all non-diversity admissions, and less than one-half of one percent of
all diversity admissions. 129 In short, as predicted, the unorthodox
definition of the America regions dramatically increases the number of
non-diversity admissions counted against South America, thus
precluding any meaningful access to the diversity lottery for
immigrants from both American continents and ensuring that more
diversity visas are available for European and African immigrants.
The effect of the regional definitions could not have come as a
surprise to the drafters of the diversity lottery-the percentage of
immigrants coming from each region has not changed substantially
since Congress was presented with the Triennial Report. The
Triennial Report showed that about 7% of all immigrants were coming
from South America, 11% from Europe, and 3% from Africa.1 30 Today,
about 7% of all non-diversity immigrants come from South America,
14% from Europe, and 4% from Africa.1 31 The percentages of non-
diversity immigrants from each region have not changed significantly
over the past 15 years, and the diversity lottery calculus has not
changed since its inception. Thus, one is led to conclude that the
127. See sources cited supra note 6. Asian immigrants typically account for about 16% of all
diversity admissions, even though almost 35% of all non-diversity immigrants also come from
Asia. See sources cited supra note 6.
128. Besides the disparate definition of the America regions, the diversity-visa-defined
regions differ from the definitions in immigration statistics in other ways. In determining which
countries and regions are high or low admission, immigrants from an overseas territory are
counted with their mother countries (and their mother countries' regions). 8 U.S.C. §
1153(c)(1)(F) (2005). Additionally, a few countries are routinely considered part of one region for
immigration statistics purposes, and part of another for diversity visa issuance purposes, most
notably Turkey (Europe for the diversity visa lottery; Asia for immigration statistics) and the
Bahamas (Caribbean for immigration statistics, but North America (not including the
Caribbean) for the lottery). Compare, e.g., Bureau of Consular Affairs, Registration for the
Diversity Immigrant (DV-2006) Visa Program, 69 Fed. Reg 65,012, 65,016-17 (Nov. 9, 2004)
(listing countries by region for the diversity visa lottery), with 2004 YEARBOOK, supra note 6, at
tbl.8 (listing countries by region for immigration statistics). The statistics in this Note take
account of these discrepancies as much as possible. See infra note 152.
129. See sources cited supra note 6.
130. See TRIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 54, tbl.F. The percentages in the text are averages of
the percentages for each year (1985-1987). See infra app. tbl.1.
131. See sources cited supra note 6.
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deviant definition of the South America region works an intentional
discrepancy.
V. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
Inasmuch as the current "diversity" system reflects a
preference for specific countries and regions to the detriment of other
deserving countries and regions, it needs reform. As evidenced by the
history of the diversity lottery itself, there are many ways to promote
diversity in the immigration stream. This Section will address three
different methods: elimination, reclassification, and randomization.
A. Elimination
It could be argued that the diversity lottery should be
eliminated, since it is designed to benefit European immigrants at the
expense of would-be South American immigrants. In fact, three bills
introduced in the House this year would do exactly that, and another
would suspend the diversity lottery indefinitely. 132 One of these bills
reintroduced legislation passed by the House in the last Congress that
would eliminate the lottery out of terrorism concerns. 133 The House
Judiciary Committee report regarding that bill characterized the
diversity visa lottery as "a threat to U.S. security" because it did not
limit the countries from which applicants could come and because it
132. H.R. 1912, 109th Cong. (2005) (proposing to suspend the allocation of diversity visas
and other "nonessential" visas indefinitely to provide "temporary" workload relief to the
immigration services departments); H.R. 1587, 109th Cong. (2005) (proposing to eliminate the
diversity visa lottery and increase the cap on a particular temporary worker visa (H-2B)); H.R.
1219, 109th Cong. (2005) (limiting its proposal to an elimination of the diversity visa lottery);
H.R. 688, 109th Cong. (2005) (proposing to eliminate the diversity visa lottery as part of a larger
plan to protect against terrorism and immigration fraud). None of these bills have proceeded out
of committee. Additionally, a Senate bill introduced this year would enable immigrants selected
by the lottery to remain eligible for processing beyond the year in which they first applied for the
program. S. 1119, 109th Cong. (2005). Also, Rep. Jackson-Lee introduced two bills that would
double the allotment of diversity visas as part of a pro-immigrant reform plan, H.R. 2092, 109th
Cong. (2005) and H.R. 257, 109th Cong. (2005), but neither of these has made it out of committee
either.
133. Compare H.R. 688, 109th Cong. (2005), with H.R. 775, 108th Cong. (2003). Other bills
introduced in the last Congress would have eliminated the diversity visa lottery until illegal
immigration had slowed to less than 10,000 individuals annually, H.R. 946, 108th Cong. (2003),
and suspended issuance of diversity visas to relieve the immigration workload, like this year's
HR. 1912, H.R. 2235, 108th Cong. (2003). Rep. Jackson-Lee also introduced two bills last year
that would have doubled the annual diversity visa allotment. See H.R. 4885, 108th Cong. (2004);
H.R. 3918, 108th Cong. (2004).
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did not require immigrants to have family or business ties to the
United States. 3 4
Elimination of the diversity visa lottery, however, would not
necessarily make this country any safer from terrorism. Immigrants
seeking admission under a diversity visa must still pass the same
security screening as all other immigrants. 135 In any event, would-be
terrorists have bypassed, and will likely continue to bypass, the
immigration system's security measures by simply crossing the border
illegally. 13 6 Thus, the diversity lottery is not likely a significant threat
to national security.
Moreover, ensuring that individuals from every country (even
those without family or business ties to the United States) have access
to the immigration process is a worthwhile goal.13 7  Even the
dissenters to the House Judiciary Committee's report on H.R. 4300
concede that "a number of regions and countries are underrepresented
under the current system."138
B. Reclassification
Another potential solution is to leave the system as it is, but to
rename the South America region "Latin America." Obviously this
does nothing to remedy current inequities; but there is a certain
appeal to calling a spade a spade. Furthermore, if our society can
stamp South America, Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean
with the cultural homogeny label, this would at least be an honest
approach.
Another possibility is to maintain a system of regions, but to
reincorporate Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean into the
North America region. A variant of this proposal would group Mexico
and the Caribbean with the North America region and group Central
America with the South America region. Alternatively, a seventh
region could be created for Central America (and/or Mexico and/or the
Caribbean).
134. H.R. REP. No. 108-747, at 4 (2004). Of course, this logic would also prevent any system
of independent immigration.
135. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2005).
136. See Ruchir Patel, Immigration Legislation Pursuant to Threats to US National Security,
32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 83, 95 (2003) (noting that foreign terrorists who have entered the
United States by crossing the border illegally have done so "without any consequence by the
INS").
137. See Legomsky, supra note 9, at 334 (arguing that we should view immigrants as
individuals, not as representatives of their native countries).
138. H.R. REP. No. 101-723, pt. 1, at 138 (dissenting views).
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Each of these solutions would have the desirable effect of
allocating diversity visas to South American immigrants along more
equitable lines than the current system does without further reducing
the small number already allocated to North American immigrants.
Of course, this solution does not address the double status enjoyed by
Ireland.139 More significantly, this solution does not address the
underlying problem-a system designed to differentiate between any
defined groupings will inevitably have discriminatory effects, which is
antithetical to a system of independent immigration.
C. Randomization
The best approach is to eliminate the region system from the
diversity lottery entirely. As Professor Stephen Legomsky has stated,
"Countries don't immigrate. People do. ' 140  A Mexican individual
without family or business ties in the United States has exactly the
same immigration prospects as an Irish individual without family or
business ties in the United States.141 The only way to truly level the
playing field for all would-be "independent" immigrants is to abandon
the region system entirely. This approach may not compensate those
countries that had previously benefited from racial and ethnic
discrimination under the national origins quota system; but
perpetuating the effects of such a discriminatory system should not be
an objective of U.S. immigration policy. Only by creating a truly equal
playing field, without respect to borders, can the United States send
the clear message that its immigration policy truly values individuals
(and diversity) without regard to race or national origin. 142
Of course, there are several ways to administer a diversity
system that disregards country (or region) of origin. The Senate
already presented one such approach-a points-based system that
selects immigrants based on their possession of characteristics
considered favorable to the national interest, such as education level.
The difficulty with this approach, however, is its inherent potential to
mask discrimination. For example, the Senate excised an English
language quotient to alleviate concerns about discrimination, only to
have the same English language criterion find its way into one of the
139. See supra notes 116 and 117 and accompanying text.
140. Legomsky, supra note 9, at 334.
141. Cf. id. (arguing that an immigration policy in which "a European who has no individual
equities and who applies for a visa today should be admitted ahead of a Mexican who has been
waiting ten years to rejoin his or her family" is antithetical to a principle of racial equality).
142. See id. at 334-35.
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House bills considered in subcommittee hearings. 143 Furthermore, the
Senate approved a provision allocating points based on a potential
immigrant's age. But if age preference is acceptable national policy,
might not gender or skin color also be acceptable considerations? As
illustrated by the current diversity lottery, cultural discrimination
may already be an accepted national policy. Put simply, there is too
much potential for discrimination in any system of independent
immigration that allows legislators to determine which characteristics
are desirable and which are not, especially since the Supreme Court
has made clear that Congress has unfettered dominion over the
immigration selection process.1 44
The only acceptable approach to independent immigration is
one that does not discriminate at any level. At this point, the
suggestion (and foresight) of the Organization of Chinese Americans is
worth reconsideration: "If after enactment, the program is determined
to not enhance diversity, then a random lottery first-come, first-serve
system should be immediately implemented."'' 45 The February 1989
American Bar Association resolution made a similar recommendation:
"a separate additional quota allotment for independent or
unsponsored immigrants based on a nondiscriminatory selection
system or lottery, or both. ."."."146 The best system for admitting
independent immigrants and increasing true diversity (cultural,
geographic, economic, and racial) is a random lottery where the only
qualification is a desire to live in "The Land of the Free."
A random world-wide lottery would allocate visas to those
geographic areas with the greatest demand. As stated by Professor
Frederick Whelan, "formal equality of treatment for countries
obviously does not mean equality of opportunity for individuals, since
a person's chance of being issued a visa, or the length of time he must
wait for one, varies greatly depending on the demand in his
country."'147 Although Whelan's statement was a criticism of the
143. See supra notes 66 and 73 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 14.
145. Immigration Act of 1989 (Part 1): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Refugees, and Int'l Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 70, at 251 (statement of
Melinda C. Yee, Executive Director of the Organization of Chinese Americans) (emphasis added).
146. Immigration Act of 1989 (Part 3): Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Refugees, and Int'l Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary and the Immigration Task Force of the
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, supra note 52, at 908, app. 21 (1990) (emphasis added). Along these
lines, Frederick Whelan's comments on the effect of the per-country ceilings is also prescient:
"Equal treatment for individuals would have called for omitting considerations of nationality
altogether and accepting applicants on a first-come first-served (or a lottery) basis within a
world-wide pool .... "Whelan, supra note 22, at 459.
147. Whelan, supra note 22, at 458-59.
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uniform country ceilings, it is equally applicable to the current lottery
system, whose highly formalized treatment of countries and regions
clearly "does not mean equality of opportunity for individuals." 148
Furthermore, it is at least theoretically possible that a random
lottery would do a better job of distributing visas to currently
underserved regions than the current lottery. If Africa, Europe, and
South America, for example, all have a similar number of individuals
desiring to immigrate to the United States, a random lottery will
ensure that, on average, each of these regions will receive an equal
allotment of lottery visas. But if it turns out that more individuals
want to immigrate to the United States from one particular region, a
random lottery will not artificially inflate or deflate the actual demand
for visas from each region. 149 In addition, a random lottery eliminates
any discrepancies in the region definitions-for example, by assigning
Middle Eastern countries to three different regions. 150  Most
importantly, however, a random lottery focuses on the individual. By
considering each applicant without regard to race, ethnicity,
nationality, religion, age, primary language, or any other artificial
criterion, 151 only a random world-wide lottery can provide a truly
equitable system of independent immigration.
VI. CONCLUSION
The history of U.S. immigration policy is riddled with
prejudicial and discriminatory practices. One could even make the
argument that Congress has become more adept at masking its
discriminatory intentions. History may yet label the strategic
definition of the South America region in the diversity visa lottery a
particularly subtle instance of discriminatory immigration policy. By
lumping Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean with the South
American continent, the drafters of the 1990 Act simultaneously
limited a cultural group's access to the diversity visa lottery and
ensured that a maximum number of diversity visas would be available
for European and African immigrants.
148. Id.
149. There are no statistics on how many individuals actually want to immigrate to the
United States from every country and region, so which areas have the greatest "demand" cannot
be determined with any degree of certainty.
150. See, e.g., Bureau of Consular Affairs, Registration for the Diversity Immigrant (DV-
2006) Visa Program, 69 Fed. Reg. 65012, 65016-17 (Nov. 9, 2004).
151. General admissibility requirements, such as an absence of affiliation with active
terrorist groups, would still have to be met by each independent immigrant, of course. See supra
note 135 and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, a system of independent immigration can add
value to our immigration policy, especially since immigrants in many
nations may otherwise be effectively denied access to the immigrant
stream. The only way to effectively administer a system of
independent immigration, however, is to eliminate the regions
altogether and issue a truly random world-wide lottery without
respect to legislatively devised, artificial criteria.
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APPENDIX 152
Table 1. Percentage of Immigrants Admitted by Region of
Birth, 1985 - 1987.153
Region 1985 1986 1987
Africa 3.0 2.9 2.9
Asia 46.4 44.6 42.8
Europe 11.1 10.4 10.2
North America 31.9 34.5 36.0
Oceania 0.7 0.6 0.7
South America 6.9 7.0 7.4
Table 2. Percentage of Non-Diversity Immigrants Admitted by
Region of Birth (South America as a continent), 1995 - 2004.154
Region 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Africa 4.3 3.7 4.2 4.2 3.5 3.6 3.8 4.3 4.9 5.1
Asia 38.8 34.8 34.4 34.9 32.1 32.4 33.7 32.9 35.9 36.0
Europe 15.5 14.3 13.1 11.7 11.9 13.5 15.4 15.5 12.4 12.2
N.America 34.2 39.6 40.9 41.4 45.1 43.1 39.9 39.7 38.0 38.2
Oceania 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6
S.America 6.6 7.0 6.9 7.3 6.8 6.9 6.6 7.2 8.2 7.9
152. This Note compares admissions to illustrate the actual effect on the immigrant stream,
even though that is not how the actual number of diversity visas allocated to a given region is
determined. See supra note 8. Because not every recipient of a diversity visa is actually
admissible, and because many recipients choose not to utilize the visa in the calendar year in
which it is granted, the numbers fluctuate from year to year and always fail to equal the number
actually granted. The numbers in Tables 2 and 3 of this appendix represent the regions as
defined in the Statistical Yearbooks; the numbers in Tables 4 and 5 represent the regions as
defined in administering the diversity visa lottery. For an explanation of how these regions differ
(besides including Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean in the South America region), see
supra note 128.
153. TRIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 54, tbl.F. The Triennial Report did not list which
countries it counted in each region, but the numbers indicate that it divided the regions largely
as did the Immigration Service in compiling its later statistical reports (which all included
Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean with North America). See supra note 107 and
accompanying text.
154. See sources cited supra note 6.
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Table 3. Percentage of Diversity Immigrants Admitted by
Region of Birth (South America as a continent), 1995 - 2004.155
Region 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Africa 29.1 35.4 32.9 33.9 32.7 31.1 37.0 38.1 35.7 40.7
Asia 13.6 16.4 16.7 17.1 15.2 14.2 14.2 16.8 17.6 16.2
Europe 50.3 42.3 44.1 42.8 45.6 48.3 42.8 39.4 41.4 37.6
N.America 2.6 2.0 2.8 2.9 3.1 2.4 1.7 1.4 0.9 0.9
Oceania 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.4
S.America 3.2 2.5 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.4 2.7 3.1 3.3 3.2
Table 4. Percentage of Non-Diversity Immigrants Admitted by
Region of Birth (South America as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c)
(including Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean)), 1995 -
2004.156
Region 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Africa 4.3 3.7 4.2 4.2 3.5 3.6 3.8 4.3 4.9 5.1
Asia 38.8 34.8 34.2 34.6 31.9 32.1 33.4 32.6 35.6 35.7
Europe 15.5 14.3 13.3 12.1 12.2 13.8 15.8 15.8 12.8 12.6
N.America 1.9 3.8 1.5 1.8 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.8
Oceania 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6
S.America 38.9 42.8 46.3 46.9 50.3 47.8 44.3 44.8 44.3 44.2
Table 5. Percentage of Diversity Immigrants Admitted by
Region of Birth (South America as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c)
(including Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean)), 1995 -
2004.157
Region 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Africa 29.1 35.4 32.9 33.9 32.7 31.1 37.0 38.1 35.7 40.7
Asia 13.6 16.4 13.9 14.4 13.0 12.7 12.7 15.2 15.5 14.0
Europe 50.3 42.3 46.9 45.5 47.8 49.8 44.3 41.0 43.5 39.7
N.America 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
Oceania 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.4
S.America 5.1 4.3 4.6 4.7 4.9 4.5 4.2 4.2 4.0 4.0
155. See sources cited supra note 6.
156. See sources cited supra note 6. For a description of how the diversity regions are
implemented, see supra notes 128 and 152. Because of changes in political boundaries since the
start of the lottery, and changes in the way immigration statistics have been maintained, there is
some uncertainty inherent in calculating these statistics.
157. See sources cited supra note 6.
20051 1997
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Figure 1. Average Percent of Non-Diversity and Diversity
Immigrants Admitted by Region of Birth (South America as a
continent), 1995-2004.158
Africa Europe South North Asia Oceania
America America
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158. See sources cited supra note 6. The average percent was derived by averaging the
percentages from each year (1995-2004).
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Figure 2. Average Percent of Non-Diversity and Diversity
Immigrants Admitted by Region of Birth (South America as defined in
8 U.S.C. § 1153(c) (including Mexico, Central America, and the
Caribbean)), 1995 - 2004.159
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159. See sources cited supra note 6. The average percent was derived by averaging the
percentages from each year (1995-2004).
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